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Abstract
With the advent of Deep Learning, the field of machine learn-
ing (ML) has surpassed human-level performance on diverse
classification tasks. At the same time, there is a stark need
to characterize and quantify reliability of a model’s predic-
tion on individual samples. This is especially true in appli-
cation of such models in safety-critical domains of indus-
trial control and healthcare. To address this need, we link
the question of reliability of a model’s individual predic-
tion to the epistemic uncertainty of the model’s prediction.
More specifically, we extend the theory of Justified True Be-
lief (JTB) in epistemology, created to study the validity and
limits of human-acquired knowledge, towards characterizing
the validity and limits of knowledge in supervised classifiers.
We present an analysis of neural network classifiers linking
the reliability of its prediction on an input to characteristics
of the support gathered from the input and latent spaces of
the network. We hypothesize that the JTB analysis exposes
the epistemic uncertainty (or ignorance) of a model with re-
spect to its inference, thereby allowing for the inference to
be only as strong as the justification permits. We explore var-
ious forms of support (for e.g., k-nearest neighbors (k-NN)
and `p-norm based) generated for an input, using the train-
ing data to construct a justification for the prediction with
that input. Through experiments conducted on simulated and
real datasets, we demonstrate that our approach can provide
reliability for individual predictions and characterize regions
where such reliability cannot be ascertained.
Introduction
Predictive and prescriptive models based on ML are at the
heart of the modern digital revolution. They are applied
across several domains, such as energy, finance, defense,
network security, and healthcare. These models often di-
rectly influence control actions or indirectly influence de-
cisions through recommendations. In many scenarios, espe-
cially safety-critical ones, although the average performance
or accuracy of such models is important, the reliability of
the model on every individual prediction is equally critical.
By reliability, we mean the degree to which the result of
the model can be relied on to be accurate. A model with
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very good average performance is still capable of causing ir-
reparable damage due to the mistakes it makes on a single or
few predictions. In this paper, we present an analysis on the
reliability of individual predictions of a ML model.
We draw inspiration from epistemology, or the theory of
knowledge, which deals with validity of methods used to
acquire knowledge. Specifically, we examine the applicabil-
ity of Plato’s classical Justified True Belief (JTB) theory in
epistemology (Ichikawa and Steup 2001). The JTB theory of
knowledge is a classical theory that attempts to provide nec-
essary and sufficient conditions under which a person can
be said to know something. We extend this theory to ML
models by firstly positing that an individual prediction from
a model can be seen as a belief equivalent to “I believe in-
put x is of class y”. Next, we propose that in order for such
belief to be considered as knowledge, an additional step of
constructing justification for the belief is necessary. We ex-
plore formulations of JTB analysis by which ML models can
construct such justifications for their beliefs.
We contend that existing approaches tend to conflate epis-
temic uncertainty, which pertains to uncertainty due to infor-
mation that is absent, with aleatoric uncertainty, which per-
tains to uncertainty arising from variability in the available
information. JTB analysis tackles this fundamental confu-
sion by not relying on confidence intervals for point-class
assignments as assessments of prediction reliability, and by
abstaining from making point-class predictions on inputs, if
concrete evidence for such assessment is absent. We rec-
ognize that there are existing approaches that make use
of thresholding on softmax layer values or distance from
the decision hyperplane to abstain from making a class as-
signment. However, none of these existing approaches link
prediction reliability to the location of the sample in the
overall input space. It is becoming clearer based on recent
work (Meng and Chen 2017) that input regions, either close
to the decision boundary or in regions of extrapolation, are
particularly susceptible with regard to making unreliable
predictions. We present a mechanism for characterizing re-
gions in input space as region of extrapolation (i.e., “I don’t
know” or IDK), region of confusion (i.e., “I may know” or
IMK), and region of trust (i.e., “I know” or IK). This novel
mechanism to construct justified belief with IK, IMK, and
IDK directly affects the reliability of the decisions made
downstream in the analytical workflows. IMK informs that
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support is impure and additional information is needed to
improve reliability and empty neighborhood in IDK informs
that input is anomalous/novel.
Additionally, it has been shown (De Vries, Memisevic,
and Courville 2016) that the softmax classifier can make
high confidence predictions that are inaccurate even for
points that are at a large distance from the decision hy-
perplane. JTB analysis overcomes these issues by explic-
itly factoring in the location of a sample in the input space,
while making its class prediction, through constructing sup-
port for the prediction based on other training data points
in the vicinity of the sample. Suggestions related to ab-
staining from making point-class predictions have been
made recently (Shafahi et al. 2018; Rouani et al. 2019;
Miller, Wang, and Kesidis 2019) (especially for adversar-
ial attack detection), but we believe our approach is the
first to separately characterize overlap (IMK) and extrapola-
tion (IDK) for individual predictions from neural networks.
Other related work like DeepKNN (Papernot and McDaniel
2018) and (Jiang et al. 2018) collect evidence for predic-
tion reliability by identifying nearest neighbors to the sam-
ple from the training points across all layers of a neural net-
work; the class-membership of the neighbors are then used
to assign a nonconformity or trust score to augment to the
class prediction. Although our approach leverages this work,
by considering the k-NN support operator for the JTB analy-
sis, in addition to other forms of support like `p-norm based
and novel hybrid forms of support, our work is different as
we can identify region of extrapolation or IDK regions and
we provide justification for individual reliability, whereas
the statistical nature of trust scores needs thresholding to de-
termine predictions that one can likely trust.
The main objectives and contributions of this work are
given as follows:
• To introduce, formalize, and illustrate the notion of justi-
fied belief from epistemology for ML models to gain reli-
ability in individual predictions.
• To contrast performance of Epistemic classifiers with
those that rely on distance from hyperplane on real and
simulated datasets.
We next introduce Epistemic classifiers, instantiated by
the application of JTB analysis to standard classifier models.
We use the rest of the paper to define concepts necessary for
formalizing the JTB analysis framework, describing algo-
rithmic steps for performing JTB analysis and inference re-
lated to it, describing experiments with applying Epistemic
classifiers and analysis of outcomes from it, and finishing
with a discussion of potential future directions of our work
and conclusions.
Concept of Epistemic Classifiers
Presently, a classification problem is not evaluated in terms
of the true class observability permitted by the training data
used to construct classifiers. In reality, the ground truth of
a particular instance might not be fully observable from the
available training data. As a result, reliable single-point clas-
sification for the dataset might not be possible. We show
how Epistemic classifiers can successfully handle this issue,
Figure 1: Illustration of region of trust (IK0, IK1), region of
confusion (IMK), and region of extrapolation (IDK) for 2-
D input binary classification with Epistemic classifier using
neural network as base classifier
through defensible abstention, while traditional classifiers
are forced to make point-class predictions without regard
to whether or not the information space permits many of
those point-class predictions. This impacts their individual
prediction reliability. Epistemic classifiers attempt to char-
acterize regions of observability and abstain from making
class-assignments in regions of the input space where such
characterization is found to be difficult to construct. Con-
sider Fig. 1 illustrating the input space of a 2-D binary classi-
fication problem. The problem we are interested in is, given
a test input x, to be able to characterize the input region for
x during inference and provide estimated class-prediction
with additional information indicating individual reliability
of the prediction. The fundamental mechanism to enable this
characterization of the input space is developed by applica-
tion of the theory of Justified True Belief (JTB) from field of
epistemology, which is discussed next.
The JTB theory of knowledge suggests that a subject S
knows that a proposition P is true if and only if P is true,
S believes that P is true, and S is justified in believing that
P is true. One key observation is that in JTB analysis, the
truth state of proposition is leveraged in the determination
of knowledge of subject, which might not be practical. In
fact, most of scientific knowledge is based on justified be-
lief, where belief is a claim or hypothesis and justification is
the experimental evidence or the mathematical proof lever-
aging existing justified beliefs to support the belief. Thus,
knowledge as justified belief will be used in this research.
We extend this theory of knowledge to supervised learning-
based classifiers. Here belief of artificial intelligence (AI) is
the same as output of the classifier model. However, we have
freedom in construction of justification and strength or de-
fensibility of justification will determine reliability of AI’s
knowledge.
If observation x is a camera image, proposition P is that
“x shows a human”, AI “believes” in P as the classifier gives
an output of human class, then AI knows P given x, iff AI is
justified in having that belief. In current AI systems, cross-
validation accuracy of model is high is used as a justification
to rely on model outputs, but this kind of justification using
aggregate statistics fails to account for unreliability at the
Figure 2: Construction of support in some embedded space
using ε-balls as neighborhoods
level of individual predictions. Thus, we introduce justifica-
tion that gathers evidence from training set for an individual
test input x in input and hidden layers of a neural network
classifier, where an unambiguous truth state in the neighbor-
hood of x in those embedded spaces provides support to the
belief allowing model to declare ”I know P ”. This support
and justification process to characterize knowledge, which
uses neighborhood to allow generalization beyond labeled
instances, is discussed next.
Neighborhood and Support
Consider a training set with predictors X and set of corre-
sponding labels Y . A neighborhood operator N (x) for an
input x is a function that returns a subset of training set, i.e.,
N (x) ⊂ X , such that each data point z ∈ N (x) is simi-
lar to x using certain distance metric and selection criterion.
Specific examples of neighborhood operators include ε-ball
neighborhood Bε(x) which uses `2 distance metric and cri-
terion that d(x, z) ≤ ε for ε ∈ R+ and k-nearest neighbor
neighborhood Nk(x) which uses distance metric d to iden-
tify k ∈ Z+ nearest neighbors of x from the training set.
Let function f map from input from training data to set of
labels, then given a neighborhood operator Ni(·), the sup-
port of input x in ith layer of neural network is defined as
follows:
Si(x) = {f(z) : z ∈ X,hi(z) ∈ Ni(hi(x))}, (1)
where hi(z) is the activation values of layer i in neural net-
work with z as input. Thus via the neighborhood operator,
the support operator is parametrized by distance bound εi or
number of neighbors ki. An illustration of ε-ball neighbor-
hood to construct support is shown in Fig. 2.
A k-NN neighborhood adapts region to look for evidence
based on data density. However, this favorable adaptability
gives k neighbors even when the sample is extrapolating and
is semantically different from all neighbors. On other hand,
ε-ball neighborhood has fixed region in which it looks for
evidence and number of evidence varies based on data den-
sity and can also lead to empty support under extrapolating
regions. However, this favorable variability is expected to
lead to ε that might be conservative in one part of input space
and loose in another part. Since, the formulation can handle
general notion of neighborhood, we also propose hybrid ver-
sions of neighborhood operators: 1) H-1 - when ε-ball neigh-
borhood is empty, then use k-NN neighborhood, and 2) H-2
- when ε-ball neighborhood is non-empty, compute union
with k-NN neighborhood. Note that when ε-ball neighbor-
hood is empty, H-1 provides more information about near-
est neighbors, but it would potentially reduce robustness as
those evidence might be obtained from semantically dissim-
ilar classes. H-2 provides stronger robustness as it increases
the set of evidence, but it would potentially increase impu-
rity of evidence, i.e. data points from different classes. In this
work, the neighborhood operators that are considered to con-
struct support in layer i, given the choice of distance metric
di, can be parametrized by size of ball neighborhood εi and
number of neighbors ki, i.e. we can represent neighborhood
operator as Ni = Ndi,εi,ki . This support operator is eval-
uated using activations over each layer of interest and then
justification operator acts over these sets of support. This
process of justification is explained next.
Justification and Knowledge
The justification operator takes as input a collection of sup-
ports from multiple layers and produces a set of justified
class assignments for an input using (2).
J(x) =
{
φ if for any Si(x) = φ,⋃
i∈I Si(x) otherwise.
(2)
If any support is empty, then J(x) is also empty, else we
use the disjunction or union for the justification operator.
Thus, the justified class assigned to input x is a union of the
class-assignments made by each of the supports from cho-
sen layers. The disjunction makes for a liberal justification
operator since a class that is contained even in one of the
supports is carried on to the output.
Based on the outcome of applying the justification op-
erator J(x) and prediction or belief g(x) for a given in-
put x, the Epistemic classifier using justified belief may as-
sert IK, IMK, or IDK. These assignments capture the epis-
temic uncertainty of the classifier with respect to the in-
put’s class. The IDK assertion captures the epistemic un-
certainty encountered when a sample finds no support for
the belief from existing training data (e.g., when the infer-
ence involves extrapolation), i.e. g(x) 6⊂ J(x). The IMK
assertion captures the epistemic uncertainty when a sample
finds conflicting support from the training data for two or
more classes which also consists of the belief, i.e., g(x) is
proper subset of J(x). For example, in Fig. 1, if test input
x = (2, 2), then J(x) = {0, 1} from support in input layer
and g(x) = {1} leading to IMK assertion. Additionally, the
IK assertion is provided when the belief and justification are
exactly the same g(x) = J(x), e.g., when x = (8, 0) in
Fig. 1. Clearly, these three degrees of epistemic uncertainty
are ordered wherein IDK captures a relatively higher degree
of ignorance about the sample class than the IMK and IMK
has higher uncertainty than IK. Now that concept of Epis-
temic classifier and intuition has been explained we will de-
fine this classifier ahead.
Definition (Epistemic classifier). Epistemic classifier (E) is
a function mapping from input space to output label and
epistemic certainty. It is defined by a tuple E = (g, I,N ),
where g is the base neural network classifier, I is the set of
chosen layers, and N = {N1, . . . ,N|I|} is a set consist-
ing of neighborhood operator for each layer. For a given
input x, this classifier obtains belief as g(x) with base clas-
sifier and constructs justification J(x) using (2) with neigh-
borhood and support operators using (1) over layers in I .
Then output E(x) = (g(x), j ∈ {IK, IMK, IDK}) consists
of belief and assertion of IK (if g(x) = J(x)), IMK (if
g(x) ⊂ J(x)), or IDK (if g(x) 6⊂ J(x)) as the degree of
epistemic certainty in the belief.
The concept of Epistemic classifiers was covered in this
section. Next we will show the training and inference al-
gorithms as well as some theoretical analysis on choice of
model parameters.
Algorithm and Analysis
In order to build an Epistemic classifier, we need a trained
neural network model g, which is the base classifier. The ev-
idence for justification process will be based on the train-
ing set (X,Y ). The parameter optimization is conducted
by evaluating metrics over the validation set (Xv, Y v). We
demonstrate our training approach in Algorithm 1.
Once we obtain the base classifier g, we feed the training
set X into neural network model g and extract ΓXi , which is
the activation from layer i ∈ I from all training instances us-
ing hi(X). Recall that hi(·) gives activation values of layer
Algorithm 1 – Training Epistemic Classifiers.
Input: training set (X,Y ), validation set (Xv, Y v)
Input: trained neural network g
Input: set of layers I for support construction
Input: metrics for each layer d¯ = {d1, ..., d|I|}
1: Ω = {} . Set of one search tree per layer in I
2: for each layer i ∈ I do
3: ΓXi ← Extract activation hi(X) for training set X
4: Ωi ← NeighborSearchTree(ΓXi , Y, di)
5: Ω← Ω⋃Ωi
6: end for
7: ε¯, k¯ = ParameterSelection(Xv, Y v,Ω, g, I, d¯)
8: return g, I, d¯, ε¯, k¯,Ω
Algorithm 2 – Inference with Epistemic Classifiers.
Input: Test input x
Input: Epistemic classifier G = (g, I,N )
1: Compute belief as prediction g(x)
2: for each layer i ∈ I do
3: Γxi ← Extract activation hi(x) for test input x
4: Si(x)← Ψ(Γxi ,Ni) . support of x in layer i
5: end for
6: Get justification J(x) from supports Si(x) using (2).
7: if g(x) = J(x) then
8: output← (IK, g(x))
9: else if g(x) ⊂ J(x) then . proper subset
10: output← (IMK, g(x))
11: else . implies g(x) 6⊂ J(x)
12: output← (IDK, g(x))
13: end if
14: return output
i for a given input. NeighborSearchTree represents a func-
tion which builds a nearest neighbor search tree based on
the information from training data and distance metric. Pa-
rameterSelection represents a function, which selects a set
of parameters ε¯ = {εi : i ∈ I} and k¯ = {ki : i ∈ I}
for support construction. We will discuss these functions in
detail next.
In NeighborSearchTree, we construct a set of ball-
trees (Omohundro 1989) denoted by Ω to store activation
values and their corresponding labels for each layer i. Un-
like k-d trees (Bentley 1975), ball-trees lead to O(log |X|)
average case complexity for exact search even in higher di-
mensions, where complexity for k-d tree is linear. These
ball-trees enable to efficiently conduct both nearest neigh-
bor search and range search, i.e., find all neighbors within
distance εi from test input z. In our implementation, we use
ball-tree method from scikit-learn (Pedregosa et al. 2011) to
construct the neighbor search tree.
Let us now consider a case where support is constructed
only from one layer, then we study the effect of choice of ε
over {IK, IMK, IDK} regions. Let FIK be fraction of sam-
ples that are asserted to be “I know”, similarly, we have
FIMK and FIDK as fraction of samples for “I may know”
and “I don’t know” respectively. Then, we can make the fol-
lowing remarks about their behavior with ε:
Remark (Behavior of {IK, IMK, IDK} with ε). Note that
FIK + FIMK + FIDK = 1, since {IK, IMK, IDK} are ex-
haustive and mutually-exclusive options for justified belief.
If ε→ 0, then FIK = 0, FIMK = 0, FIDK = 1, since very
small neighborhoods will not be able to find any evidence.
If ε → ∞, then FIK = 0, FIMK = 1, FIDK = 0, since
very large neighborhoods will include training points from
all classes as evidence. FIMK is a monotonically-increasing
function of ε, since impure support cannot become pure or
empty, but pure or empty support of a data point can be-
come impure as size of neighborhood increases. Similarly,
FIDK is a monotonically-decreasing function of ε, since
empty neighborhood might get new evidence, but nonempty
neighborhoods will not become empty as ε increases.
Figure 3 illustrates these intuitive behaviors using a toy
dataset (Gaussian distribution with some overlap) for a bi-
Figure 3: Illustration of behavior of fraction of IK, IMK,
and IDK as well as accuracy on IK from Epistemic classifier
with parameter of neighborhood operator
nary classification task. The metric FIK or fraction of IK
samples is also called coverage. Note that accuracy for IK
samples stays high over different coverage levels as desired.
Thus, in this work, objective function used to choose optimal
ε is coverage and not accuracy. The relation of coverage with
ε is piece-wise constant as data points move between regions
of IDK or IMK and IK. Thus, this optimization for Parame-
terSelection function can be accomplished with grid search
or by using Bayesian optimization (BO) (Snoek, Larochelle,
and Adams 2012), where coverage metric is evaluated over
validation set.
Given εi for one layer-case, we derive an upper bound of
the εi+1 such that if data point z is an εi-neighbor of the
testing input x in layer i, then it is guaranteed that z is an
εi+1-neighbor of the testing input x in layer i+1. We obtain
the following result:
Remark (ε bound). If Wi ∈ Rm×n is weight matrix of the
layer i with input dimension m and output dimension n, λ∗i
is the largest eigenvalue of the matrixWiWTi ,Li is the Lips-
chitz constant of the activation function of layer i, then given
εi for layer i, the value of εi+1 is bounded as follows:
εi+1 ≤ Li
√
λ∗i εi.
Proof. See Supplementary material (S1).
This result is used to choose conservative values of ε
across multiple layers by setting value of εi+1 at the up-
per bound. Note that the weight matrix of layer i leads to
an affine projection of εi-ball, thus considering only scaling
will lead to a loose bound in most of the directions except of
the largest principal component. Thus, we also introduce a
weighted distance metric based on the weight matrices of
the neural network that is constructed for each layer. We
define the following metric for each layer i, di(xa, xb) =√
(xa − xb)TDi(xa − xb) and Di is a symmetric positive
semi-definite matrix. The following remark informs how to
choose the values for Di.
Remark (Bound with weighted distance). Let W˜i =
W1W2...Wi, Λ = diag([λ1, λ2, ...λn]) and U =
[v1, v2, ...vn] as the first n non-zero eigenvalues and corre-
sponding eigenvectors of matrix W˜iW˜i
T
, and d0 is `2 dis-
tance metric in input space. If d0(x, z) ≤ ε0 then the dis-
tance function matrix Di for neighbor search in any layer
i:
Di = U
T W˜iΛ
−1W˜i
T
U (3)
satisfies the following relation:√
(hi(x)− hi(z))TDi(hi(x)− hi(z)) ≤ ε0
Proof. See supplementary material for assumptions and
derivations.
Thus, with this layer-specific metric for each layer, we can
use the same value of ε0 for each layer of interest. Due to
activation functions, which are applied after the affine pro-
jection, the bound obtained by using weighted distance is
still going to be conservative in several directions. Moreover,
computation of eigenvalue decomposition for large weight
matrices is also intractable. Thus, we provide an alternate
mechanism to compute the values of ε¯ parameters. BO is
proposed for selecting the value of ε¯ = {εi : i ∈ I} for each
layer. BO is computationally tractable for most situations as
parameter tuning for Epistemic classifiers does not require
base model retraining and repetition of ball-tree construc-
tion. Moreover, layers of interest are chosen to be very few
(1 − 3), so the number of parameters to jointly tune is very
limited. The choice of layers where support is constructed
is not considered as a hyperparameter for optimization. If
we consider only output layer, then classifier will lack ro-
bustness against adversarial perturbations as the neighbor-
hood might already be consistent with targeted class. If we
consider only input layer, then it might be computationally
expensive due to data dimensionality and in some cases we
might lose some robustness as semantic similarity in input
space might not be well-represented by `p-norms. More-
over, if neighborhood is pure in or close to input layer and
is also pure in or close to final layer, and these neighbors
are consistent, then the benign/malign perturbation was not
successful in leading to misclassification or incorrect belief.
Thus, a combination of layer closer to input, where search is
tractable, and layer closer to output are considered. We will
further justify this choice with experimental results.
During inference stage, a testing sample x is used with
the Epistemic classifier according to Algorithm 2. The ac-
tivations due to the sample x from layers of interest I are
extracted. Epistemic classifier then finds the neighborhood
and support for the testing input x across the selected layers
based on the extracted activation values. This operation to
find support in layer i is denoted by operator Ψ, which uses
activation from test point Γxi in layer i and neighborhood op-
eratorNi. Justification is then created using (2) with support
from layers of interest. This justification and belief is then
used to obtain justified belief.
Experiments and Discussion
In this section, we will first identify metrics for compari-
son and then describe experiments with our inferences and
insights from the results. We introduce the concept of aug-
mented confusion matrix (ACM) that consists of three sub-
Figure 4: Effect of ε (0.001, 0.017, 0.237, 3.162) on aug-
mented confusion metric with noise std. of 1.0.
Figure 5: Effect of noise (σ = 0.5, 1.0, 1.5) and overlap on metrics as a function of ε
Nominal Gaussian Uniform Large-Noise
FIK AIK A¬IK FIK AIK A¬IK FIK AIK A¬IK FIK AIK A¬IK
Grid Base 0.661 0.995 0.826 0.720 0.863 0.573 0.770 0.721 0.557 0.933 0.433 0.494
model: k-NN 0.692 0.990 0.818 0.720 0.869 0.560 0.754 0.748 0.486 0.776 0.457 0.368
FC ε-NN 0.615 0.992 0.850 0.532 0.858 0.696 0.331 0.738 0.656 0.001 0.750 0.437
(93.74) H-2 0.581 0.995 0.858 0.494 0.878 0.688 0.301 0.757 0.651 0.001 0.750 0.437
Iris Base 0.889 1.000 1.000 0.867 1.000 1.000 0.822 0.973 1.000 0.800 0.528 0.222
model: k-NN 0.911 1.000 1.000 0.889 1.000 1.000 0.889 0.975 1.000 0.822 0.459 0.500
FC ε-NN 0.889 1.000 1.000 0.800 1.000 1.000 0.800 1.000 0.889 0.178 0.500 0.459
(100) H-2 0.889 1.000 1.000 0.800 1.000 1.000 0.800 1.000 0.889 0.178 0.500 0.459
Italy Base 0.897 0.985 0.689 0.862 0.983 0.662 0.814 0.956 0.665 0.796 0.712 0.548
model: k-NN 0.909 0.981 0.691 0.864 0.983 0.657 0.826 0.954 0.654 0.718 0.717 0.579
CNN ε-NN 0.894 0.977 0.761 0.821 0.970 0.793 0.588 0.942 0.844 0.001 1.000 0.678
(95.40) H-2 0.856 0.982 0.791 0.765 0.986 0.785 0.543 0.957 0.836 0.001 1.000 0.678
Nominal Gaussian Uniform Adv-Noise
FIK AIK A¬IK FIK AIK A¬IK FIK AIK A¬IK FIK AIK A¬IK
SynCon Base 0.907 0.996 0.929 0.730 0.995 0.728 0.727 0.977 0.756 0.243 0.562 0.577
model: k-NN 0.907 1.000 0.893 0.733 0.991 0.738 0.730 0.977 0.753 0.440 0.955 0.274
CNN ε-NN 0.897 1.000 0.903 0.493 0.980 0.868 0.433 0.985 0.865 0.343 0.942 0.381
(99.00) H-2 0.863 1.000 0.927 0.437 0.992 0.870 0.393 0.983 0.874 0.307 0.957 0.404
MNIST Base 0.622 0.998 0.899 0.424 0.988 0.738 0.306 0.888 0.491 0.851 0.026 0.011
model: k-NN 0.671 0.999 0.881 0.449 0.996 0.720 0.234 0.976 0.501 0.222 0.028 0.023
FC ε-NN 0.590 0.997 0.907 0.371 0.982 0.763 0.108 0.901 0.577 0.000 0.000 0.024
(96.03) H-2 0.495 0.999 0.922 0.279 0.997 0.785 0.071 0.982 0.584 0.000 0.000 0.024
GTSRB Base 0.466 1.000 0.952 0.475 1.000 0.913 0.485 1.000 0.833 0.631 0.064 0.112
model: k-NN 0.595 1.000 0.936 0.574 1.000 0.892 0.535 0.999 0.816 0.414 0.099 0.069
CNN ε-NN 0.488 0.999 0.950 0.488 0.998 0.912 0.485 0.996 0.837 0.140 0.015 0.092
(97.41) H-2 0.377 1.000 0.959 0.373 1.000 0.927 0.359 1.000 0.865 0.102 0.018 0.089
Table 1: Results on Grid Stability, Iris, and Italy Power dataset in top part and results on Synthetic Control (SynCon) time-series
dataset as well as MNIST and GTSRB image datasets in bottom part. Base model test accuracy on nominal data is provided in
first column.
matrices, where each sub-matrix is a confusion matrix for
predicted label versus true label under assertion of IK (top),
IMK (middle), and IDK (bottom). See Fig. 4 for examples
of ACM. Several robust generalization metrics can be de-
vised using this matrix. In this work, we will use coverage
or fraction of IK (FIK), accuracy over IK samples (AIK),
and accuracy over non-IK samples (A¬IK).
To generate Fig. 4, the Epistemic classifier with a fully-
connected neural network is trained with data generated
using make blobs (bivariate Gaussian) from scikit-learn.
We use ε-ball neighborhood with `2 distance metric and we
use ball-tree to conduct search. Given 4 distinct values of ε
on log-scale, the results on test data is shown with ACM in
Fig. 4. It is noted that as value of ε is small (resp. large), we
have almost all assertions as IDK (resp. IMK). Moreover,
in general, the confusion matrix under small ε for IDK and
that under large ε for IMK is also similar. As ε increases the
points in IDK region get assigned to IK and some to IMK
region. At higher values, points in IK region move to IMK
and finally at large ε all points are assigned to IMK region.
In Fig. 5, we conduct experiment with similar setup but
now study variation due to extent of overlap. Irrespective of
choice of parameters, we should not be able to provide relia-
bility for inputs coming from region that has overlap, but we
should be able to characterize that region of confusion. Here
we show the scatter plot of complete dataset and variation
in accuracy of IK (AIK) and fraction of IK (FIK) metrics
with choice of ε. Note that maximum value of FIK reduces
as overlap increases implying that region where reliable pre-
dictions can be made has reduced, e.g. FIK ≈ 1.00, when
noise std. σ = 0.5 and FIK ≈ 0.44, when noise std. is 1.5.
We then conducted experiments using Grid Stabil-
ity (Arzamasov, Bo¨hm, and Jochem 2018) and Iris dataset
from UCI Repository (Dua and Graff 2017), Italy Power De-
mand classification (Keogh et al. 2006) and Synthetic Con-
trol (SynCon) dataset (Alcock, Manolopoulos, and others
1999) from UCR Time-series Repository (Chen et al. 2015),
MNIST image dataset (LeCun 1998), and German Traffic
Sign Recognition Benchmark (GTSRB) dataset (Stallkamp
et al. 2012) to get prediction reliability under various per-
turbations for different baseline models. We have used con-
volutional neural networks (CNN) for Italy Power, Syn-
Con, and GTSRB datasets and for other datasets we have
used fully-connected (FC) neural networks as base classi-
fiers. After generating these base classifers, we build Epis-
temic classifiers using Algorithm 1. We show performance
of the Epistemic classifier on normal holdout testing data as
well as on test datasets with perturbations to show context
change or drift. In top part of Table 1, we consider Gaus-
sian noise, uniform noise, and large uniform noise to cre-
ate rubbish and highly overlapping examples. In bottom part
of Table 1, we consider Gaussian noise, uniform noise, and
adversarial perturbation using Basic Iterative Method (Ku-
rakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio 2016) from Adversarial Ro-
bustness Toolbox (Nicolae et al. 2018). Details of individual
datasets, base model architecture, perturbation magnitudes,
and base model accuracy are reported in Supplementary ma-
terial (S2). The baseline approach for comparison uses a cal-
ibrated threshold over softmax layer output that allows to
abstain when max over softmax layer values is below a cer-
tain threshold. To make the comparison fair, we first deter-
mine the optimal ε for ε-NN neighborhood operator, where
FIK is maximized. We tune the parameters for our baseline
and k-NN support such that they have the similar coverage
as ε-ball support, then we make comparison in the table to
compare accuracy and performance under nominal data and
various perturbations.
Few insights from Table 1 are discussed next. Softmax
thresholding baseline performs well on zero-mean small per-
turbations and is comparable to performance with k-NN
neighborhood operator. However, specifically consider Grid,
MNIST, and GTSRB dataset, under large uniform noise and
adversarial perturbation cases, where distance to hyperplane
and location of other data points would start to differ, we see
that baseline has high fraction of IK but very poor accuracy
on IK. Under these cases, ideal solution is to have high FIK
and highAIK for adversarial robustness or at least be able to
assert IDK and get very low FIK for detection of malicious
perturbations. This is true for ε-NN and H-2 neighborhood
operator as highlighted in bold. Note that accuracy metric
for large perturbation does not matter as the test samples
are more likely to be rubbish examples or indeed in vicin-
ity of wrong class. The results also highlight that ε-NN and
H-2 cases have lower coverage than k-NN in all cases, how-
ever it has superior reliability under large perturbations. We
have omitted the results for H-1 support as it is similar to k-
NN operator, but those results are included in supplementary
material. In supplementary material (S3), we have provided
additional results where we consider neighborhood only in
logit layer and in logit and intermediate layers together. Like
baseline, support in only logit layer has good coverage, but
lacks robustness under perturbations, thus gathering support
from at least two layers is preferable. Although, the met-
rics in Table 1 denote ability of developed approach to pro-
vide individual reliability in scenarios of extrapolation (i.e.
anomaly detection) and overlap, additional outcomes show-
ing ability to characterize overlap between subset of classes
are omitted due to space restrictions.
This paper deals with the reliability due to observabil-
ity and noise. While BIM-based adversarial attacks have
been considered, we have explored other inference-time and
backdoor attacks as well. A detailed treatment of adversarial
robustness is being planned for a follow-on paper.
Challenges and Limitations
In this approach of identifying support for justification, there
are five main challenges, which have not been completely
addressed in this research yet. Firstly, large dimensionality
of input and embedded space in early layers leads the k-d
tree and ball-tree search algorithm to be computationally ex-
pensive and is impractical for large convolutional layers of
state-of-the-art models. Locality-sensitive hashing (Slaney
and Casey 2008) and other approximate neighbor search ap-
proaches (Andoni and Indyk 2006) can be used to alleviate
these issues. Secondly, number of training data points, i.e.,
|X| leads to O(log |X|) average case complexity for search
and O(|X|) for space, which becomes of concern for large
datasets. Thirdly, the most crucial challenge that we have
come across is the closeness of semantic distance between
points and the mathematically-convenient `2-norm distance
metric in input and early layers. The closeness of these met-
rics increases as we go deeper in the network, since neu-
ral network training is expected to bring data points from
same classes closer to enable linear separation, however in
input and initial layers this closeness is usually not available.
Fourthly, sparsity of data in neighborhood either due to high
dimensionality or low sample size will also adversely affect
the performance of this classifier. Finally, the current ap-
proach is suited only for neural networks, a model-agnostic
approach using suitable input representation and output with
Platt scaling (Platt and others 1999) will be explored for
other ML models. These challenges will be further explored
in near future.
Conclusion
In this work, we have introduced a novel approach to pro-
vide individual reliability of predictions from ML models.
We leveraged the notion of Knowledge as Justified Belief
from field of epistemology to create Epistemic classifiers in
ML. Epistemic classifier adds more contextual information
based on location of training data points in input and hid-
den layers to add reliability on individual predictions, wher-
ever plausible. We also introduced various domain-agnostic
neighborhood operators which can be used to gather evi-
dence to construct justification. We analyzed the effect of pa-
rameter choices, noise in training dataset, and benign/malign
perturbations on performance, where performance was re-
ported using new metrics relevant to the epistemic analysis.
We contrasted the performance of Epistemic classifiers with
a baseline of thresholding softmax layer values and demon-
strated superiority in robustness. The results were demon-
strated on simulated and real datasets with few features,
time-series data, and image data to show flexibility of the so-
lution. Finally, key limitations were highlighted which will
pave the way for future research.
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Supplementary Material
(S1) Analysis of ε and metric
Remark (ε bound). If Wi ∈ Rm×n is weight matrix of the
layer i with input dimension m and output dimension n, λ∗i
is the largest eigenvalue of the matrixWiWTi ,Li is the Lips-
chitz constant of the activation function of layer i, then given
εi for layer i, the value of εi+1 is bounded as follows:
εi+1 ≤ Li
√
λ∗i εi.
Proof. Defined an input to the layer i as x ∈ Rm×1, out-
put of the layer i given the input x is defined as hi(x) =
φi(x
TWi + bi), where bi ∈ R1×n and φi : R1×n → R1×n
is the activation function for the layer i. Given another input
z ∈ Rm×1 where (x−z)T (x−z) ≤ ε2i , and assuming Lips-
chitz constant for layer i activation function φi(.) is Li, then
we have
‖ hi(z)− hi(x)‖2
=
∥∥ φi(zTWi + bi)− φ(xTWi + bi)∥∥2
≤ max
z
∥∥ Li(zTWi + bi)− Li(xTWi + bi)∥∥2
≤ max
z
∥∥ Li(x− z)TWi∥∥2
= max
z
√
L2i (x− z)TWiWTi (x− z)
To solve the upper bound, let’s define δ = x− z and ignore
the Lipschitz constant for now, then we can reformulate the
problem as
max
δ
δTWiW
T
i δ
st δT δ ≤ ε2i
Lagrangian function of the formulation is
L(δ, λ) = δTWiWTi δ − λ(δT δ − ε2i )
Solution for the Lagrangian function is
∇δL = 2WiWTi δ − 2λδ = 0
∇λL = δT δ − ε2i = 0
Thus, we have
δ∗TWiWTi δ
∗ = λδ∗T δ∗ = λε2i
‖ hi(z)− hi(x)‖2 ≤ Li
√
λ∗εi
where λ∗ is the largest eigenvalue of the matrix WiWTi .
Thus, relation of εi across consecutive layers is given by:
εi+1 ≤ Li
√
λ∗εi.
Considering the output of ith layer given input from the first
layer as
h˜i(x) = hi−1 (hi−2 (...h0 (x))) .
Similarly, we know that for (x− z)T (x− z) ≤ ε2, we have∥∥∥ h˜i(z)− h˜i(x)∥∥∥
2
≤ max
z
∥∥∥∥∥∥
i−1∏
j=0
Lj(x− z)TW0W1...Wi−1
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ Li
√
λ˜∗ε,
where λ˜∗ is the largest eigenvalue of the matrix
W0W1...Wi−1WTi−1...W 1
TW 0
T .
However, this bound might be loose in terms of direction
of the vector δ = x − z. Therefore, alternate approach is to
derive a distance metric for each layer.
Remark (Bound with weighted distance). Let W˜i =
W1W2...Wi, Λ = diag([λ1, λ2, ...λn]) and U =
[v1, v2, ...vn] as the first n non-zero eigenvalues and corre-
sponding eigenvectors of matrix W˜iW˜i
T
, and d0 is `2 dis-
tance metric in input space. If d0(x, z) ≤ ε0 then the dis-
tance function matrix Di for neighbor search in any layer
i:
Di = U
T W˜iΛ
−1W˜i
T
U (4)
satisfies the following relation:√
(hi(x)− hi(z))TDi(hi(x)− hi(z)) ≤ ε0
Proof. Assume activation functions are ReLu and Lips-
chitz constant is 1. Defined the following metric d : X ×
X → R, where, for each layer i, we have di(x, z) =√
(x− z)TDi(x− z) and Di is a symmetric PSD matrix.
For simplification, we start with h(x) = xTW + b where
x ∈ Rm×1, W ∈ Rm×n and b ∈ R1×n. We make an as-
sumption that n ≤ m, which is a common practice since
most of neural networks have less neurons in deeper lay-
ers. Based on previous derivation, we know that distance be-
tween x and z will be local maximum after projection if di-
rection of the vector δ = x− z in the input space is aligned
with one of the eigenvectors of the matrix WWT . Assum-
ing there are n non-zero eigenvalues for the matrix WWT
since we know rank(WWT ) ≤ n and Lipschitz constant of
activation Li is 1. Define Λ = diag([λ1, λ2, ...λn]) ∈ Rn×n
and U = [v1, v2, ...vn] ∈ Rm×n as first n non-zero eigen-
values and corresponding eigenvectors, we could obtain the
following metric for neighbor search:
D = UTWΛ−1WTU.
Additionally, if (x− z)T (x− z) ≤ ε02, then we have√
(h(x)− h(z))TD(h(x)− h(z)) ≤ ε0.
Similarly, for ith layer of a fully-connected deep neural
network, we have
Di = U
TW0W1...Wi−1Λ−1WTi−1...W
T
1 W
T
0 U.
(S2) Dataset and Base Model Description
Performance of the base classifiers on the original test data
and their architectures are listed as follow:
Fully connected neural network:
UCI-Grid stability (Dua and Graff 2017) (Arzamasov,
Bo¨hm, and Jochem 2018) (FNN):
Base classifier accuracy: 93.74%
Input dimension: 13
Network Architecture:
Dense layer: 32 + 32, Output: 2
Activation: ReLu
Perturbation:
Gaussian: 0.03 standard deviation of training data
Uniform noise range: +/- 0.09 standard deviation of train-
ing data
Large perturbation: Uniform +/- 0.5*(max-min)
Selected layer: 2nd Dense layer + logit
UCI-IRIS (Dua and Graff 2017) (FNN):
Base classifier accuracy: 100%
Input dimension: 4
Network Architecture:
Dense layer: 8 + 5, Output: 3
Activation: ReLu
Perturbation:
Gaussian: 0.03 standard deviation of training data
Uniform: +/- 0.09 standard deviation of training data
Large perturbation: Uniform +/-0.5*(max-min)
Selected layer: 2nd Dense layer + logit
MNIST (LeCun 1998) (FNN), Data scale to [0,1]:
Base classifier accuracy: 96.03%
Input dimension: 784
Network Architecture:
Dense layer: 32 + 32, Output: 10
Activation: ReLu
Perturbation:
Gaussian: 0.1 standard deviation of training data
Uniform: +/- 0.3 standard deviation of training data
Adversarial perturbation: +/- 0.2
Selected layer: 2nd Dense layer + logit
Convolutional neural network:
UCR-Italy Power Demand (Keogh et al. 2006) (CNN):
Base classifier accuracy: 95.4%
Input dimension: 1 * 24
Network Architecture:
Convolutional layer (num, kernel size 1, kernel size 2):
(6,1,4) + (16,1,12) + (8, 1, 6) + Global average pooling
(GAP), Output: 2
Activation: ReLu
Perturbation:
Gaussian: 0.2 standard deviation of training data
Uniform: +/- 0.6 standard deviation of training data
Large perturbation: Uniform +/-0.5*(max-min)
Selected layer: 3rd Convolutional layer + GAP
UCR-SynCon (Alcock, Manolopoulos, and others 1999)
(CNN):
Base classifier accuracy: 99%
Input dimension: 1 * 60
Network Architecture:
Convolutional layer (num, kernel size 1, kernel size 2):
(9,1,12) + (12,1,16) + (9,1,12) + Global average pooling
(GAP), Output: 6
Activation: ReLu
Perturbation:
Gaussian: 0.5 standard deviation of training data
Uniform: +/- 1 standard deviation of training data
Adversarial perturbation: +/- 0.2
Selected layer: 3rd Convolution layer + GAP layer
GTSRB (Stallkamp et al. 2012) (CNN), Data scale to
[0,1]:
Base classifier accuracy: 97.41%
Input dimension: 32*32*3
Network Architecture:
Conv(6,5,5) + maxPool((2,2), (2,2)) + Conv(16,5,5) +
maxPool((2,2), (2,2)) + Conv(64,5,5) + Global average
pooling (GAP) + Dense layer 32, Output: 8
Activation: ReLu
Perturbation:
Gaussian: 0.033 standard deviation of training data
Uniform: +/- 0.1 standard deviation of training data
Adversarial perturbation: +/- 0.05
Selected layer: GAP layer + logit
Preprocessing for GTSRB Data: Training, validation
and testing data for the traffic sign classification are gener-
ated from GTSRB traffic sign dataset. We group traffic sign
types into eight classes which are: speed limit, no passing,
end of restriction, warning, priority, yield, stop and direc-
tion. In the end, we have 34799 images for training, 4410
for validation and 12630 images for testing.
Figure 6: Traffic sign dataset, from top to bottom are: speed
limit, no passing, end of restriction, warning, priority, yield,
stop and direction.
(S3) Additional Results
Table 2 show results for MNIST, SynCon, and GTSRB
datasets, where support was constructed in logit layer only
and in logit layer and another intermediate layer.
Nominal Gaussian Uniform Adv-Noise
FIK AIK A¬IK FIK AIK A¬IK FIK AIK A¬IK FIK AIK A¬IK
SynCon Base 0.907 0.996 0.929 0.730 0.995 0.728 0.727 0.977 0.756 0.243 0.562 0.577
Model: KNN 0.907 1.000 0.893 0.733 0.991 0.738 0.730 0.977 0.753 0.440 0.955 0.274
CNN ε-NN 0.897 1.000 0.903 0.493 0.980 0.868 0.433 0.985 0.865 0.343 0.942 0.381
Accuracy: H-1 0.933 1.000 0.850 0.783 0.983 0.708 0.757 0.982 0.712 0.457 0.942 0.264
0.9900 H-2 0.863 1.000 0.927 0.437 0.992 0.870 0.393 0.983 0.874 0.307 0.957 0.404
Base 0.940 0.996 0.889 0.827 0.980 0.654 0.810 0.975 0.667 0.403 0.579 0.570
KNN 0.953 1.000 0.786 0.840 0.976 0.646 0.827 0.968 0.673 0.510 0.745 0.395
SynCon ε-NN 0.920 0.996 0.917 0.740 0.955 0.833 0.613 0.951 0.862 0.480 0.667 0.487
(logit) H-1 0.957 0.997 0.846 0.900 0.959 0.600 0.850 0.953 0.711 0.603 0.707 0.370
H-2 0.907 1.000 0.893 0.680 0.975 0.812 0.587 0.972 0.839 0.377 0.699 0.497
MNIST Base 0.622 0.998 0.899 0.424 0.988 0.738 0.306 0.888 0.491 0.851 0.026 0.011
Model: KNN 0.671 0.999 0.881 0.449 0.996 0.720 0.234 0.976 0.501 0.222 0.028 0.023
FC ε-NN 0.590 0.997 0.907 0.371 0.982 0.763 0.108 0.901 0.577 0.000 0.000 0.024
Accuracy: H-1 0.696 0.997 0.876 0.523 0.986 0.689 0.270 0.944 0.489 0.222 0.028 0.023
0.9603 H-2 0.495 0.999 0.922 0.279 0.997 0.785 0.071 0.982 0.584 0.000 0.000 0.024
Base 0.814 0.995 0.809 0.598 0.973 0.653 0.466 0.814 0.436 0.909 0.025 0.010
KNN 0.815 0.995 0.808 0.589 0.980 0.649 0.382 0.871 0.452 0.325 0.026 0.023
MNIST ε-NN 0.792 0.986 0.862 0.610 0.934 0.703 0.358 0.736 0.543 0.000 0.000 0.024
(logit) H-1 0.859 0.986 0.803 0.708 0.940 0.612 0.515 0.777 0.437 0.325 0.026 0.023
H-2 0.724 0.995 0.868 0.481 0.982 0.716 0.225 0.870 0.537 0.000 0.000 0.024
GTSRB Base 0.466 1.000 0.952 0.475 1.000 0.913 0.485 1.000 0.833 0.631 0.064 0.112
Model: KNN 0.595 1.000 0.936 0.574 1.000 0.892 0.535 0.999 0.816 0.414 0.099 0.069
CNN ε-NN 0.488 0.999 0.950 0.488 0.998 0.912 0.485 0.996 0.837 0.140 0.015 0.092
Accuracy: H-1 0.584 0.999 0.939 0.586 0.998 0.892 0.592 0.996 0.794 0.452 0.091 0.073
0.9741 H-2 0.377 1.000 0.959 0.373 1.000 0.927 0.359 1.000 0.865 0.102 0.018 0.089
Base 0.740 0.999 0.903 0.741 0.999 0.826 0.730 0.997 0.687 0.888 0.069 0.178
KNN 0.737 1.000 0.903 0.716 0.999 0.842 0.679 0.991 0.750 0.555 0.085 0.077
GTSRB ε-NN 0.737 0.995 0.916 0.740 0.991 0.849 0.729 0.974 0.752 0.186 0.025 0.095
(logit) H-1 0.819 0.996 0.877 0.827 0.992 0.773 0.824 0.977 0.620 0.589 0.081 0.082
H-2 0.625 1.000 0.932 0.618 0.999 0.882 0.581 0.992 0.805 0.153 0.028 0.091
Table 2: Results on Synthetic Control (SynCon) time-series dataset as well as MNIST and Traffic Sign image datasets
